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Introduction
As Max Weber was a professor of economics, it is perhaps appropriate to discuss
modern “behavioral economics” in a lecture in his honor. Indeed – modern economics
has returned to many of the issues that fascinated Weber, ranging from political economy
to the theory of organizations. Behavioral economics purports to be instrumental in these
extensions – my goal in this lecture is to address the question of what – if anything –
behavioral economics brings to economics.
Certainly behavioral economics is all the rage these days. The casual reader might
have the impression that the rational homo economicus has died a sad death and the
economics profession has moved on to recognize the true irrationality of humankind.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Criticism of homo economicus is not a new
topic. In 1898 Thorstein Veblen wrote sarcastically rational economic man as “a
lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a homogenous globule of
desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli.” This description had little to do with
economics as it was practiced then – and even less now. Indeed, for a long period of time
during the 60s and 70s, irrational economic man dominated economics. The much-
criticized theory of rational expectations was a reaction to the fact that irrational
economic man is a no better description of us than that of a “lightning calculator of
pleasures and pains.” In many ways the rational expectations model was a reaction to
“[t]he implicit presumption in these … models … that people could be fooled over and
over again,” as Robert Lucas wrote in 1995.
The modern paradigmatic man (or more often these days woman) in modern
economics is that of a decision-maker beset on all sides by uncertainty. Our central
interest is in how successful we are in coming to grips with that uncertainty. My goal in
this lecture is to detail not the theory as it exists in the minds of critics who are unfamiliar
with it, but as it exists in the minds of working economists. The theory is far more
successful than is widely imagined – but is not without weaknesses that behavioral
economics has the potential to remedy.2
 Theory That Works: Voting
One of the most widespread empirical tools in modern behavioral economics is
the laboratory experiment in which people – many times college undergraduates, but
often other groups from diverse ethnic backgrounds – are brought together to interact in
artificially created social situations to study how they reach decisions individually or in
groups. Many anomalies with theory have been discovered in the laboratory – and
rightfully these are given emphasis among practitioners, as we are most interested in
strengthening the weaknesses in our theories. However, the basic fact should not be lost
that the theory works remarkably well in the laboratory.
The heart of modern “rational” economic theory is the concept of the Nash (or
non-cooperative) equilibrium of a game. A game is simply a careful description of a
social situation specifying the options available to the “players,” how choices among
those options result in outcomes, and how the participants feel about those outcomes.
One of the most controversial applications of the theory is to voting. Modern voting
theory, for example, the theory of Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1996], is based on the idea
that your vote only matters when it decides an election – when it is pivotal. This has
implications for voter participation – that elections must be close enough to give voters
an incentive for costly participation. Whether this is how voters behave is quite
controversial. Levine and Palfrey [2007] examined this question in the laboratory. We
divided participants into unequal teams of voters, and each voter was randomly assigned
a cost of participating in the election – known only to that voter. Each voter additionally
received a prize if their team received the most votes. We then computed, using the
theory of Nash equilibrium and the assumption that voters were completely selfish and
cared only about their own money income, the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
This is a difficult computation, hinging critically on the fact that the participation rate
must be such as to make the pivotal voter indifferent between participating and
abstaining. Indeed, we were able to solve the problem only numerically.
We then re-created the theoretical environment in the laboratory. The key aspect
is that we had no expectation that voters could guess, calculate, or otherwise intuitively
figure out how best to behave. Rather, as is central to modern economic theory (see the
quote of Lucas above) we imagined that given an opportunity to learn they would reach
an equilibrium. So we gave them ample opportunity to learn – voters got to participate in3
fifty elections each. The key measure of how well the theory worked is to ask how the
empirical frequency of pivotal events and upset elections compared to the prediction of
the theory. The figure above, from Levine and Palfrey [2007], plots the theoretical
predictions on the horizontal axis and the empirical frequencies on the vertical axis. It
should be emphasized that there are no free parameters – the theory is not fit to the data,
rather a direct computation is made from the parameters of the experiments. If the theory
worked perfectly the observations would align perfectly on the 45 degree line. As can be
seen, they do.
This example of theory that works is but one of many. Other examples are double
oral auctions [Plott and Smith, 1978], and more broadly competitive environments [Roth
et al, 1991], as well as games such as best-shot [Prasnikar and Roth, 1992].
Theory That Works? Ultimatum Bargaining
Despite the fact that the theory works extremely well for a variety of games, there
are some famous “failures.” One of the most famous is the ultimatum bargaining game.
Here one player proposes the division of an amount of money – often $10, and usually in
increments of 5 cents – and the second player may accept, in which case the money is
divided as agreed on, or reject, in which case neither player gets anything. This game is
frequently analyzed using a “refinement” of Nash equilibrium that requires that a Nash4
equilibrium must occur whatever the history of past play. In particular, in ultimatum
bargaining, if the second player is selfish, he must accept any offer that gives him more
than zero. Given this, the first player should ask for – and get – at least $9.95.
Not surprisingly this prediction – that the first player asks for and gets $9.95 – is
strongly rejected in the laboratory. The table below shows the experimental results of
Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir [1991]. The amount X  represents the part of
the $10 offered to the second player. (The data is rounded off to the nearest 25 cents.)
The number of offers of each type is recorded in the second column, and the fraction of
second players who reject is in the third column. Notice that the results cannot easily be
attributed to confusion or inexperience, as players have already engaged in 9 matches
with other players. It is far from the case that the first player asks for and gets $9.95.
Most ask for and get $5.00, and the few that ask for more than $6.00 are likely to have
their offer rejected.
The failure of the theory here is more apparent than real. First, the theory does not
demand that players be selfish, although that may be a convenient approximation in
certain circumstances, such as competitive markets. It is clear from the data that they are
not: a selfish player would never reject a positive offer, yet ungenerous offers are clearly
likely to be rejected. Technically this form of social preference is called spite: the
willingness to accept a loss in order to deprive the opponent of a gain. Once we take5
account of the spite of the second player, the unwillingness of the first player to make
large demands becomes understandable.
Let us look more closely at what theory really tells us about this game. Any
theory is an idealization. The preferences – in this case selfish preferences – we write
down are at best an approximation to players’ “true” preferences. Theorists incorporate
this idea through Radner’s [1990] concept of approximate or F-equilibrium. Suppose that
I S  is a strategy choice by player I, that  I N  are his beliefs about the play of his opponents,
and that  \	 II I US N  is a numerical “utility” or “payoff” that player I expects to receive
given his own strategy and beliefs. The condition for F equilibrium is that each player
should choose a strategy  I S  that loses no more than F
	 	 II I II I US US NF N a p .
and that his beliefs  I N  should be correct. If   F   this is the definition of Nash
equilibrium. Why allow for   F  ? Simply put, F is our measure of how much the
“true” preferences of the player differ from the preferences  I U  that we have written
down. So we allow the possibility that the true “payoff” to player I from playing  I S
might be somewhat larger than we have written down, but by no more than F. In effect F
is a measure of the approximation we think we made when we wrote down a formal
mathematical model of player play, or of the uncertainty we have about the accuracy of
that model.
A measure of the accuracy of our model then is not given by whether play “looks
like an equilibrium” but rather by whether F is small. Take the case of ultimatum
bargaining. We can easily compute the losses to players playing less than a best-response
to their opponent as averaging $0.99 per game out of the $10.00 at stake. What is
especially striking is that most of the money is not lost by second players to whom we
have falsely imputed selfish preferences, but rather by first movers who incorrectly
calculate the chances of having their offers rejected. Notice, however, that a first player
who offers a 50-50 split may not realize that he could ask for and get a little bit more
without being rejected, nor if he continues to offer a 50-50 split, will he learn of his
mistake.
In mainstream modern economic theory, a great deal of attention is paid to how
players learn their way to “equilibrium” and what kind of equilibrium might result. It has
long been recognized that players often have little incentive to experiment with6
alternative courses of action, and may as a result, get stuck doing less well than they
would if they had more information. The concept of self-confirming equilibrium captures
this idea. It requires that beliefs be correct about the things that players actually see – the
consequences of the offer they actually make – but not that they have correct beliefs
about things they do not see – the consequences of offers that they do not make. Using
this concept we can distinguish between knowing losses, representing losses a player
might reasonably know about, and unknowing losses due to imperfect learning. In
ultimatum bargaining, of the $0.99 per game that players are losing, $0.34 are knowing
losses due to second players rejecting offers, and the remaining $0.63 are due to
incomplete learning by the first mover. The details of these calculations can be found in
Fudenberg and Levine [1997].
One message here is that between social preferences – a major focus of behavioral
economics – and learning – a major focus of mainstream economics – in this experiment
the role of learning is relatively more important than social preferences. The second
message is that the failure of the theory is much less than a superficial inspection
suggests. Simply comparing the prediction of subgame perfection to the data indicates an
abysmal failure of the theory. Yet a reasonable measure of the success of the theory is
that players lose only $0.34 out of the possible $10.00 that they can earn.
Equilibrium: The Weak versus the Strong
The key problem with F-equilibrium is not that it makes inaccurate predictions,
but rather than it can be a weak theory, often making far too broad a range of predictions.
The ultimatum bargaining game is a perfect example: with   F   the observed
behavior is as much an equilibrium as is all the first players demanding $9.95 and getting
it. While weakness is not a good thing in a theory, it is important to recognize that the
theory itself tells us when it is weak and when it is strong. When there is a narrow range
of predictions – as in the voting game, or in games such as Best Shot or competitive
bidding – the theory is useful and correct. When there is a broad range of predictions
such as in ultimatum bargaining the theory is correct, but not as useful.
The role for behavioral economics – if there is to be one – is not to overturn
existing theory, but it must be instead to strengthen it. That is, psychological factors are7
weak compared to economic factors, but in certain types of games that may make a great
deal of difference.
To get a sense of the limitations of existing theory, it is useful to take a look under
the hood of the voting game described above. At the aggregate level the model predicts
with a high degree of accuracy. However, as anyone who has ever looked at raw
experimental data can verify, individual play is very noisy and poorly described by the
theory. The figure below from Palfrey and Levine [2007] summarizes the play of
individuals. The optimal play for an individual depends on the probability of being
pivotal (deciding the election) and on the cost of participation. The horizontal axis
measures the loss from participating depending on the cost that is drawn. If – in the given
election – the cost drawn should make the player indifferent to participating, the loss is
zero. Otherwise it can be negative or positive, depending on how much is lost from
participating. The vertical axis is the empirical probability of participating. The red dots
are the results of individual elections. The blue dots are averages of the red dots for each
loss level, and the green curve is a theoretical construct described below. The theory says
that this “best response” function should be flat with the probability of participating equal
to one until gains (negative losses) reach zero on the horizontal axis, then a vertical line,
then again flat with a value of zero for all losses that are bigger than zero. This is far from
the case: some players make positive errors, some make negative errors. The key is that
in this voting game, the errors tend to offset each other. Over voting by one voter causes
other voters to want to under vote, so aggregate behavior is not much effected by the fact8
that individuals are not behaving exactly as the theory predicts. A similar statement can
be made about a competitive auction and other games in which equilibrium is strong and
robust. By way of contrast, in ultimatum bargaining, a few players rejecting bad offers
changes the incentives of those making offers, so that they will wish to make lower offers
– moving away from the subgame perfect equilibrium, not towards it.
A key feature of the individual level data is that behavior is sensitive to the cost of
“mistakes.” That is, voters are more likely to play “sub-optimally” if the cost of doing so
is low. The same is true in ultimatum bargaining: bad offers are less costly to reject than
good ones, and are of course rejected more frequently.
This fact: the weakness of incentives when players are near indifferent, can be
captured without any “psychological” analysis quite effectively through what has become
known as quantal response equilibrium, or QRE. This logistic choice model that has been
used by economists since McFadden’s [1980] work has become popular due to the work
of McKelvey and Palfrey [1995] in analyzing experimental data. It supposes that play is
somewhat random. Suppose that  	 II S T  is the probability with which player I plays the
strategy  I S . Let   I M   be a parameter of the choice function. We first define
propensities with which strategies are played,  	 EXP   		 II I II I PS US MT ￿  . This says that
strategies that yield higher utilities have higher propensities of being played. The QRE
equilibrium probabilities are given by normalizing the propensities to add up to one.
￿ 	 	   	
I II II II S SP S P S T   .
Notice that this formulation contains an unknown preference parameter  I M . If   I M 
play is completely random. As  I M  becomes large, the probability of player the “best”
response approaches one. So we can interpret  I M  as a kind of index of rationality. To give
an idea how this theory works, in the voting experiment we can estimate a common value
of  I M  for all players. The corresponding equilibrium probabilities of play are given by the
green curve in the figure above, which does an excellent job of describing individual play
– although it makes roughly the same predictions for aggregate play as Nash equilibrium.
While QRE is useful in explaining a great many experimental deviations from
Nash equilibrium in games where Nash equilibrium is weak, it captures only the cost side
of preferences. That is, it recognizes – correctly – that departures from standard “fully
rational” selfish play are more likely if they are less costly in objective terms, but it does9
not attempt to capture the benefits of playing non-selfishly. It cannot capture, for
example, the fact that under some circumstances players are altruistic, and in other
spiteful. The modern literature on social preferences and fairness including Rabin [1993],
Levine [1998], Fehr and Schmidt [1999], Bolton and Ockenfels [2000], and Gul and
Pesendorfer [2004] attempt to capture that idea. On the other hand we already observed
that incomplete learning is a more important source of deviations from the “pure” theory
than are social preferences. The QRE does a good job of capturing errors that arise from
incomplete learning – indeed, it is implied by learning models such as the smooth
fictitious play of Fudenberg and Levine [1995].
Learning and Self-confirming Equilibrium
Learning and incomplete learning – whether or not we regard this as “behavioral”
economics – are an important part of mainstream economics and have been for quite
some time. An important aspect of learning is the distinction between active learning and
passive learning. We learn passively by observing the consequences of what we do
simply by being there. However we cannot learn the consequences of things we do not
do, so unless we actively experiment by trying different things, we may remain in
ignorance.
As I indicated, the notion of self-confirming equilibrium from Fudenberg and
Levine [1993] captures this idea. A simple example adapted from Sargent, Williams and
Zhao [2006a] by Fudenberg and Levine [2009] shows how this plays a role in
mainstream economic thought. Consider a simple economic game between a government
and a typical or representative consumer. First, the government chooses high or low
inflation. Then in the next stage consumers choose high or low unemployment. Consumer
always prefer low unemployment, while the government (say) gets 2 for low
unemployment plus a bonus of 1 if inflation is low. If we apply “full” rationality
(subgame perfection), we may reason that the consumer will always choose low
unemployment. The government recognizing this will always choose low inflation.
Suppose, however, that the government believes incorrectly that low inflation leads to
high unemployment – a belief that was widespread at one time. Then they will keep
inflation high – and by doing so never learn that their beliefs about low inflation are false.10
This is what is called a self-confirming equilibrium. Beliefs are correct about those things
that are observed – high inflation – but not those that are not observed – low inflation.
This simple example cannot possibly do justice to the long history of inflation –
for example in the United States. Some information about the consequences of low
inflation is generated if only because inflation is accidentally low at times. Sargent,
Williams and Zhao use a sophisticated dynamic model of learning about inflation to
understand how in the U.S. Federal Reserve policy evolved post World War II to
ultimately result in the conquest of U.S. inflation.
While the current economic crisis is surprising and new to non-economists, it is
much less so to economists who have observed and studied similar episodes throughout
the world. Here too learning seems to play an important role. Sargent, Williams, Zha
[2006b] examine a series of crises in Latin America from a learning theoretic point of
view. They assume that consumers have short-run beliefs that are correct, but have
difficult correctly anticipating long run events (the collapse of a “bubble”). Periodic
crises arise as growth that is unsustainable in the long-run takes place, but consumers
cannot correctly foresee that far into the future.
In talking about the crisis, there is a widespread belief that bankers and
economists “got it wrong.” Economists anticipate events of this sort, but by their nature
the timing is unpredictable. Bankers by way of contrast can hardly be accused of acting
less than rationally. Their objective is not to preserve their banks or take care of their
customers – it is to line their own pockets. They seem to have taken advantage of the
crisis to do that very effectively. If you can pay yourself bonuses during the upswing, and
have the government cover your losses on the downswing, there is not much reason to
worry about the business cycle.
Behavioral Theories
While behavioral economics points to many paradoxes and problems with
mainstream economics, their own models and claims are often not subject to a great deal
of scrutiny. Here I examine some popular behavioral theories.
The naif at the health club: Consider the following facts from Della Vigna and
Malemendier [2006] about health club memberships. First, people who chose long-term
memberships rather than pay per visit paid on average $17 per visit as against a $10 per11
visit fee. Leaving aside the hassle factor of availability of lockers and the need to pay
each visit, we can agree that this is some evidence that people are trying to make a
commitment to attending the health club.
In the idealized world usually studied by economists, there is no need for a single
decision-maker ever to commit. In reality we often choose to make commitments to avoid
future behavior we expect to find tempting but with bad long-term consequences: the
drug addict who locks himself in a rehab center would be an obvious example. The long-
term membership in a health club has a similar flavor. Skipping a workout can be
tempting but has bad long-term consequences for health. Having to pay $10 will make it
easier to find excuses to avoid going.
So far so good for behavioral economics. They have identified a phenomenon that
standard models cannot explain – the desire for commitment in single-person decision
problems. Of course even with the commitment, some people eventually give up and stop
going to the health club. However, Della Vigna and Malmendier’s data shows that people
typically procrastinate for an average of 2.3 months before canceling their self-renewing
membership. The average amount lost is nearly $70 against canceling at the first moment
that attendance stops.
Leaving aside that fact that it may take a while to make the final decision to quit
the club, we are all familiar with procrastination. Why cancel today when we could
cancel tomorrow instead? Or given the monthly nature of the charge, why not wait until
next month. One behavioral interpretation of procrastination is that people are naïve in
the sense that they do not understand that they are procrastinators. That is, they put off
until tomorrow, believing they will act tomorrow, and do not understand that tomorrow
they will face the same problem and put off again. There may indeed be some people that
behave this way. But if we grant that people who put off cancellation are making a
mistake, there are several kinds of untrue beliefs they might hold that explains this. One
is that they are procrastinators and do not know it. Another is that it is really simple and
inexpensive to cancel their membership, but people incorrectly perceive that it will be an
time consuming hassle involving endless telephone menus, employees who vanish in
back-rooms for long periods of times, and all the other things we are familiar with
whenever we try to cancel a credit card charge.12
The question to raise about the “naïve” interpretation then is this. Which is more
likely: that people are misinformed about something they have observed every day for
their entire lives (whether or not they are procrastinators) or something that they have
observed infrequently and for which the data indicates costs may be high (canceling)?
Learning theory suggests the latter – people are more likely to make mistakes about
things they know little about.
Another point worth mentioning is that so called “impulsive” behavior – that is,
giving in to temptation – is often everything but. Take Eliot Spitzer who lost his job as
governor of New York because of his “impulsive” behavior in visiting prostitutes. Yet the
fact is that he paid months in advance (committing himself to seeing prostitutes rather
than the other way around) and in one case flew a prostitute from Washington D.C. to
New York – managing to violate Federal as well as State law in the process. Similarly,
when Rush Limbaugh was discovered to be carrying large quantities of viagra from the
Dominican Republic it was widely suspected that he had gone their on a “sex vacation” –
hardly something done impulsively at the last minute. Or perhaps a case more familiar to
most of us – how about the Las Vegas vacation? This also is planned well in advance,
with the anticipation of the rush of engaging in impulsive behavior. Of course, the more
sensible among us may plan to limit the amount of cash we bring along.
The point here is simple: our “rational” self is not intrinsically in conflict with our
impulsive self. In fact the evidence is that our rational self often facilitates rather than
overrides the activities of our impulsive self.
Prospect theory to the rescue: Psychologists widely regard the decision
theoretic model used by economists – expected utility theory – as nuts. The reasons for
this are subtle – although there is a real problem we discuss in the conclusion – but
psychologists also have a serious alternative called prospect theory. This has two parts:
one is that gains and losses are measured relative to a reference point. Unfortunately for
economists the reference point seems to vary from setting to setting in a not entirely
explained manner. Let us focus on the second part of prospect theory – the part that says
that people overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities. Bruhin,
Fehr-Duda, and Epper [2007] (economists, by the way) carry out a careful experimental
study to find what the probability weighting function might be. Suppose that  I P  is the13
chance of winning one of two prizes   I X p . They find that for gains, many people














One issue with theories, however, is that they make a range of predictions – not only in
the laboratory, but also outside the laboratory. Which would you rather have:
A. $5,000 for sure (or)
B. a 50-50 coin-flip between $9,700 dollars and nothing
Most people I imagine would prefer A. However an individual with the “typical” utility
function above will choose B. So prospect theory is not without its own paradoxes.
To pursue this further, prospect theory is motivated in part by an important
decision theoretic puzzle called the Allais paradox. Consider the following two scenarios:
In Scenario 1 you choose between a certain $1 million and a lottery offering a nothing
with a 1% probability, $1 million with an 89% probability, and $5 million with a 10%
probability. Most people choose the certain $1 million. In Scenario 2 you are offered the
choice between two lotteries. The first lottery offers nothing with 89% probability and $1
million with 11% probability, while the second offers nothing with 90% probability and
$5 million with 10% probability. Here most people choose the 10% chance of $5 million.
However no expected utility maximizer can make these choices: if $1 million for sure
was chosen in Scenario 1 then any expected utility maximizer must choose the 11%
chance of $1 million in Scenario 2. Prospect theory offers a possible resolution of this
paradox because smaller probabilities are exaggerated, making the first choice relatively
unattractive in Scenario 1, but not so much so in Scenario 2. Unfortunately the Bruhin,
Fehr-Duda, and Epper [2007] utility function above does not lead to the Allais reversal.
While explaining the laboratory data, it fails to explain the Allais paradox.
Becker, Marschak and DeGroot: Returning to the theme of which types of
mistakes are most likely, another paradox of behavioral economics is the so called
willingness to pay versus willingness to accept. For example, if we ask people how much
they are willing to pay for a coffee cup they will state a relatively low value; if we give
them a coffee cup and ask how much they will sell it for they will state a relatively high
value. On the surface this is not a paradox: we all know to buy low and sell high.
However: the elicitation of values is done using a method called the Becker Marschak14
DeGroot elictation procedure. A willingness to pay or accept payment is stated, then a
random draw is made. If the random draw is lower than the stated value (in the
willingness to pay case) then the item is sold at the randomly drawn price. If the draw is
higher than the stated value then no transaction takes place.
Is it obvious to you that when this procedure is used that the unambiguously best
course of action is to bid your true value and not buy low and sell high? It is true, and
subjects are often informed of this fact. So: is there a paradox here, as some behavioral
economists and psychologists would argue, or is it simply the case that people have
trouble understanding a complex and unfamiliar procedure? The answer is the latter:
Zeiler and Plott [2004] show that if subjects are well trained in understanding the
elicitation procedure – so they clearly understand that the best thing to do is to state their
true value – then there is no difference between willingness to pay and willingness to
accept payment. If the observation that people have trouble understanding complex
decisions and sometimes make mistakes is “behavioral” then we scarcely need
experimental evidence to prove the point – the fact that students get exam questions
wrong should be proof enough that people fall short of complete and total rationality.
 Psychology versus Economics
Much of behavioral economics arises from the fact that people have an emotional
irrational side that is not well-captured by mainstream economic models. By way of
contrast, psychologists have long been fascinated with this side of humankind, and have
many models and ideas on the subject. Not surprisingly much of behavioral economics
attempts to import the ideas and models developed by psychologists. Those who know
me know that I have a series of  “why psychologists are dumber than pigeons” jokes.
Since the psychologists I know are all smarter than me, you can see where that leaves me.
More to the point – it is important to recognize that the goals of psychologists and
economists are very different, and that this has implications for importing ideas from
psychology into economics.
The key difference between psychologists and economists is that psychologists
are interested in individual behavior while economists are interested in explaining the
results of groups of people interacting. Psychologists also are focused on human
dysfunction – much of the goal of psychology (the bulk of psychologists are in clinical15
practices) is to help people become more functional. In fact, most people are quite
functional most of the time. Hence the focus of economists on people who are “rational.”
Certain kinds of events – panics, for example – that are of interest to economist no doubt
will benefit from understanding human dysfunctionality. But the balancing of portfolios
by mutual fund managers, for example, is not such an obvious candidate. Indeed one of
the themes of this essay is that in the experimental lab the simplest model of human
behavior – selfish rationality with imperfect learning – does an outstanding job of
explaining the bulk of behavior.
The difference between group and individual behavior is quite crucial in other
ways as well. There is a small segment of the psychology literature that effectively
commits a fallacy of composition, reasoning that if we can explain individual behavior,
this carries over immediately to the group. The most obvious example of this is the idea
that if we could somehow make people better – more altruistic, say – then society at large
would be better off. This is far from the case – a nice example of an interactive setting
where better people result in an inferior society can be found in Hwang and Bowles
[2008]. In a more intuitive way – from the point of view of the clinical practitioner,
making a Mafia don more functional might be a good thing. Indeed medical ethics is
entirely focused on the patient, with no allowance for the role of the patient in society. Of
course making a Mafia don more functional can be extremely bad for society more
broadly. The bottom line is that what is good for the individual is not always good for
society, and we need and use game-theoretic and related models in order to understand
the consequences of individual behavior for the group.
The need to study groups of potentially large numbers of individuals imposes
constraints on economic models of individual decision making that are not present for
psychologists. Economists need simple broad models of behavior. Narrow complex
models of behavior cannot easily be used to study the behavior of many people
interacting. Hence the focus by economists on axiomatic models that provide some
assurance that the model explains not only particular data, but gives good results over a
broad range of social settings. To take a particular example, research in psychology on
hyperbolic discounting focuses on finding clever functional forms that will fit a broad
range of data on human (and animal) behavior involving delayed rewards. From an16
economist’s perspective, such models can be useful in testing and calibrating our own
models – but they cannot be usefully embedded in complex social situations.
Finally, there is the question of decision making and the physiology of decision
making – for example as mapped out by peering into the brain with fMRI machines. The
key thing to understand is that for the kinds of decisions that economists are interested in
much of the action does not take place in the brain, nor is it subject to the memory and
other limitations of the human brain. Even before we all had personal computers, we had
pieces of paper that could be used not only for keeping track of information – but for
making calculations as well. For most decisions of interest to economists these external
helpers play a critical role – and no doubt lead to a higher level of rationality in decision
making than if we had to make all decisions on the fly in our heads.
A useful summing up is by considering the main theme of this lecture: that
behavioral economics can contribute to strengthening existing economic theory, but, at
least in its current incarnation, offers no realistic prospect of replacing it. Certain types of
“behavioral” models are already important in mainstream economics: these include
models of learning; of habit formation; and of the related phenomenon of consumer lock-
in. Behavioral criticisms that ignore the great increase in the scope and accuracy of
mainstream theory brought about by these innovations miss the mark entirely. In the
other direction are what I would describe as not part of mainstream economics, but rather
works in progress that may one day become part of mainstream economics. The ideas of
ambiguity aversion, and the related instrumental notion that some of the people we
interact with may be dishonest is relatively new and still controversial. The use of models
of level-k thinking to explain one-time play in situations where players have little
experience works well in the laboratory, but is still unproven as a method of analyzing
important economic problems. The theory of menu choice and self-control likewise has
still not been proven widely useful. The theory of interpersonal (or social) preferences is
no doubt needed to explain many things – but so far no persuasive and generally useful
model has emerged.
 The Rabin Paradox
So far we have focused on those puzzles and paradoxes that have captured the
imagination of economists and psychologists. The fact is that these are all of somewhat17
secondary importance to economists. There is, however, one dramatic flaw in the existing
theory of expected utility that might make a good ending point for this essay. This flaw is
by no means of second order importance, yet has received relatively little attention from
behavorial economists – or for that matter psychologists. This is the Rabin [2000]
paradox.
I will give my own version of the Rabin paradox – drawn from years of watching
experimental papers presented in which attitudes towards risk are measured – without
once mentioning that the results are nonsense by three orders of magnitude. One measure
economists use of risk aversion is the so-called “coefficient of relative risk aversion.” The
bigger this number, the more you are willing to pay for a certain alternative to a risky
prospect. Suppose that your lifetime wealth is $860,000 which is about the median in the
United States. Suppose also that you are indifferent between a 70% - 30% chance of A:
$40 and $32 and B: $77 and $2 – which many people are in the laboratory  [Holt and
Laury 2002]. Then your coefficient of relative risk aversion is 27,950. If this sounds like
a big number it is. One important puzzle much studied by economists is why the rate of
return on stocks is so much higher than on bonds, given that stocks are not all that much
more riskier. In fact we can also calculate how risk averse a person would be who is on
the margin between buying stocks (S&P 500 index mutual fund) versus U.S. government
bonds – a situation many of us are in. The answer is that the corresponding coefficient of
relative risk aversion is 8.84. This is over three orders of magnitude different than the
answer we find in the laboratory.
To give credit to psychologists – their main model of attitudes towards risk is
prospect theory, which allows attitudes towards risk to depend on the context (or
“reference point”). There is no way to explain the wildly different attitudes towards large
and small risks without some model of context dependence. Here is surely an area where
rapid and immediate progress is needed.18
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